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ABSTRACT
This article assesses the extent to which incomplete contracts and
agreements in waste management limit accountability to
stakeholders. The theory of incomplete contracts holds that
contracts are under-specified in areas where transaction costs in
controlling contingencies exceed the perceived benefits to be
derived from such control. A textual analysis of the narrative
embodied in public policy documents, the corporate plans of an
Australian regional waste management authority and its member
councils, and transcripts from interviews with key actors, indicate
complex contractual relations resulting from commonwealth and
state waste policies. The study finds transaction costs are the
immediate cause of incomplete contracts in the provision of
waste data. The resulting agency problem could be alleviated by
designing a more complete social contract, through legislation
and regulations specifying minimum data requirements in
contracts to outsource waste management. Improved regulation
would facilitate more effective policing of illegal stockpiling of
wastes and reveal the impact of the recently increased waste
disposal to landfill on proximate amenities such as property values.
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Concerns about the environmental benefits of re-cycling waste compared to the cost of
landfill began to be widely reported in the early 1990s. An increase in recycling has sub-
sequently resulted in oversaturated markets and volatile prices for recycled goods, and
improper disposal of collected recyclables (Loughlin and Barlaz 2006). Some countries,
such as Germany, have better records in managing these processes than others, e.g. Aus-
tralia (Blue Environment 2014). The disclosure of waste management data has an impor-
tant role to play in improving the outcomes of environmental waste management by
providing stakeholders with information to pressure their political representatives for
change (Lloyd-Smith 2009).
In this article we assess how, and the reasons why, incomplete agreements and con-
tracts (Hart and Moore 1999) in regional Australian environmental management net-
works constrain the collection and reporting of waste data to higher levels of
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government. Official data on national waste generation and resource recovery in Austra-
lia are reported on a three-yearly basis. The most recent data were reported in 2013
(DEE 2014). The quality of national waste data depends on the collection and consoli-
dation of accurate, complete and valid waste data obtained from the states and terri-
tories. Consultants responsible for the consolidation of regional waste data reported
that in many cases gaps in the data reported were filled by their professional judgement
(Blue Environment 2014).
A comparison of waste recovery rates across Australia shows that Tasmania ‘under-per-
forms’ in the recovery and diversion of waste from landfill (Blue Environment 2014;
Redmond et al. 2014). As elsewhere in Australia, waste service providers such as recyclers
are often not required to report waste data under relevant state legislation. Third parties
mostly do not verify data, and voluntary disclosures through questionnaires and surveys
show low response rates (Net Balance 2009).
A substantial portion of the regional data reported by the Department of the Environ-
ment and Energy (2014) is specific to waste collected and disposed by local government
authorities (LGAs). LGAs often contract waste services to external providers (Bel,
Fageda, and Mur 2014). The consequential delegation of data collection responsibilities
has diminished the value of waste data for national reporting purposes, amplifying existing
environmental data collection and reporting vulnerabilities (e.g. Oates and Moradi-
Motlagh 2016; Tavares 2017). Data collection and reporting of waste data in Australia
is held to be insufficient and inaccurate (EPHC 2010b).
In Australia, processes established by political institutions to meet social expectations
are frequently implemented through the mechanisms of private or quasi-private
markets. In waste management, it is common for local councils to contract with third
parties, often private corporations, to collect kerbside waste, separate recyclables and
dangerous items, and distribute these to appropriate locations, such as landfill sites, recy-
cling plants and sites devoted to the containment of toxic waste. The costs of these trans-
actions are usually determined by the negotiation of individual contracts between the local
authority and the waste disposal provider. On the other side of the transaction, the local
authority includes these costs in the calculation of rates, being a form of transaction cost,
levied on its constituents. Likewise, state and federal governments may provide subsidies
and introduce waste disposal levies to implement nationally determined waste manage-
ment policies.
The adequacy of agreements between state and local government, and private con-
tracts between local government and waste service providers, regarding the provision
of waste data, is therefore important. In this article, we apply the theory of incomplete
contracts, to investigate the provision of waste management data, following a textual
analysis of policy statements and transcripts of interviews concerning the value of
those documents. The method isolates thematic elements from large volumes of text
and sets them in a narrative context (Bruner 1998). This method of text analysis pre-
serves the narrative element by identifying and reporting the broad contextual factors
in which the origins of paucity of management data and lack of accountability lie.
The findings of this research will assist waste managers and policy makers to develop
stronger accountability contracts with respect to the provision of waste data, resulting
in more effective monitoring mechanisms and informative reporting strategies
(Curran and Hollander 2002).
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Review of prior relevant research
The accountability duties of public managers and accountants with regard to environ-
mental reporting are primarily to comply with statutory provisions in an increasingly
complex regulatory environment (Aulich, Sansom, and McKinlay 2013). Disclosure of
performance, such as reduction of waste disposal to landfill, is also increasingly demanded
by stakeholders (Bebbington and Gray 1993; Ball 2012). The collection and reporting of
waste data place considerable demands on the professional skills and resources of LGA
managers (Ball, Broadbent, and Moore 2002). Studies show that Australian LGAs have
limited resources to collate and distribute environmental information to internal and
external stakeholders (Oates and Moradi-Motlagh 2016). Australian LGA managers
often view accountability in minimalistic terms of satisfying state government regulations,
not for ethical and environmental reasons or to provide better monitoring of waste man-
agement at a national level (Lodhia, Jacobs, and Park 2012).
External contracting of waste management services by LGAs introduces another layer of
accountability. While external contracting results in the flow of waste data across organis-
ational boundaries, under-specified contracts could potentially undermine reporting require-
ments (Ball, Broadbent, and Jarvis 2006). Accountability challenges for Australian LGA
managers, as elsewhere, arise fromproblems inherent in contracting processes, i.e. a principal
versus multiple self-interested agent relationships with ill-defined performance measures
(Jensen and Meckling 1976; Mulgan 2006). For example, waste service providers, including
LGAs, who operate waste collection, landfill or resource recovery services, often do not
want commercially confidential datamade available to their competitors (Net Balance 2009).
To minimise opportunistic behaviour of agents, governments incur transaction costs to
specify more detailed data reporting requirements and monitoring measures (Brown,
Potoski, and Van Slyke 2007). Due to accentuated cost considerations, under-specified
clauses regarding waste data in contracts negatively influence an LGA’s ability to collect
and report public waste data to higher levels of government. According to the theory of
incomplete contracts (Hart and Moore 1999), for these agreements to be adequately
specified, additional transaction costs in terms of writing, negotiation, measuring and
monitoring are incurred. Avoidance of the additional transaction costs results in ineffec-
tive, under-specified agreements (Bel and Fageda 2007).
As government policy interventions, the Australian National Waste Policy Implemen-
tation Plan (‘implementation plan’) and TasmanianWaste Strategy (the ‘Tasmanian strat-
egy’) suggest the adoption of complex contracting principles to establish best-practise
waste management networks and to improve collection and reporting of waste data to
higher levels of government (EPA 2009; EPHC 2010a). Complex contracting in the
public sector can be broadly conceptualised as anything from normal commercial,
arms-length contracts to collaboration with closely connected partners (Bel and Fageda
2008; Bel, Fageda, and Mur 2014). Public managers are prone to keep difficult-to-
measure and highly asset-specific services in-house (Williamson 1999; Brown, Potoski,
and Van Slyke 2010). Numerous studies have reported local government managers enter-
ing into voluntary collaborations to reduce costs and improve efficiencies (Bel and Gradus
2017) in line with the theories of Williamson (1981, 1999). In Australia, these collabor-
ations are often formally governed through contract driven, purpose specific, joint
LGAs (Denhardt and Denhardt 2000; Kloot and Martin 2007).
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The expansion in the scale and scope of complex contracting in the Australian public
sector in the past two decades raises the question of whether the implicit social contract
between constituencies and their government and its agencies, for the provision of positive
community outcomes has been maintained (Aulich 2011). Guaranteeing improved public
waste services delivery outcomes, e.g. reduction of disposal to landfill, in a complex con-
tracting environment requires new governmental roles (Bae 2010). A lack of federal and
state government guidance, such as legislative frameworks and standards for complex con-
tracts, results in an uncertain policy environment (Burritt 2012).
In this context, instances of mixed messaging and conflicting interventions between
federal and state governments are likely to arise (Keast, Mandell, and Brown 2006). The
introduction of service-level agreements, as a communication device to clearly define obli-
gations, has been argued as a means to improve the accountability relationship between
local and state governments (Moll and Hoque 2008; Reid 2012). The uncertain policy
environment can further be remedied with regulation aimed at improving information
flows between a myriad of actors. In Australia, ecologically sustainable development regu-
latory review processes are historically supported by the publication of a regulatory impact
statement. In assessing the net economic, societal and environmental benefits, effective
public discourse necessitates suitable monitoring mechanisms and informative reporting
strategies (Curran and Hollander 2002).
Social contract theory has been proposed as a way of framing the discussion of environ-
mental issues. In the context of environmental accountability, this is based on the idea that
public sector organisations have a social contract with society to perform certain tasks that
will benefit the environment (Burritt and Welch 1997). Some have noted in a legitimacy
context that any social contract for protection of the environment is under-prescribed. It
may arise from the fact that different managers at different levels of an environmental pro-
tection process often have different perceptions about the various ‘terms’ of a contract
(Deegan 2002).
A lack of environmental management skills and resources in Australian local govern-
ment (Pini 2009) is also likely to contribute to the writing of under-specified contracts and
service agreements (Brown, Potoski, and Van Slyke 2007; Bel, Fageda, and Warner 2010;
Minkoff 2013). This is another possible cause of poor quality public reporting of waste
data (Blue Environment 2014).
The implications of under-reporting of waste data, arising from the various causes
identified in prior research, for establishing effective environmental waste management
policies and practices are not yet well explored (Bel, Fageda, and Warner 2010; Burritt
2012). This article contributes to an improved understanding of this issue through the
analysis of documents and interviews with those involved in waste management processes,
using the theory of incomplete contracts.
Theory and method
Theory
The economic theory of incomplete contracts holds that the parties to a contract cannot
fully predict all future possible scenarios (Hart and Moore 1999). In service delivery con-
texts, such as those involving outsourcing, contracts are incomplete, not only because the
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parties did not foresee the contingency, but also because it is too expensive to describe all
contingencies (Brown, Potoski, and Van Slyke 2006; Bel and Fageda 2007; Rodrigues,
Tavares, and Araújo 2012). Hart and Moore (1999) see the incomplete contract literature
as a development of transaction cost economics (Williamson 1981). Difficult-to-measure
services and contingencies around ownership and management of specialised assets
increase transaction costs and therefore the likelihood of underspecified contracts in
waste management (Williamson 1999; Brown, Potoski, and Van Slyke 2010).
In the under-reporting of waste data, incomplete contracts represent a trade-off
between the hard-to-measure social value of improved environmental waste management
outcomes and the less hard-to-measure estimated transaction costs of their procurement.
The visibility of the latter make it likely that, in the absence of a requirement upon the
parties to a contract to explicitly consider the value of public good outcomes, the costs
of providing waste data and its audit limit contractual waste data reporting. Less complete
contracts allow the contracting parties to explore opportunities for innovative, new waste
management techniques, but the lack of specification leaves room for opportunism by
either the vendor or the contracting government (Brown, Potoski, and Van Slyke 2007).
The unresolved information asymmetry in waste management contracts resulting from
the omission of reporting and auditing requirements leads to agency problems of hold-up,
adverse selection and moral hazard. For example, a lack of resources dedicated to best-
practice environmental waste management leads to market failure through a lack of
parties willing to negotiate the provision of modern waste management services. Then,
when such services are forthcoming, for-profit service providers or managers may act
in their own interests and not disclose sufficient information to establish adequate
accountability (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Net Balance 2009; Brown, Potoski, and Van
Slyke 2010). Thus, although external contracting may result in operational cost savings,
it may also lead to deterioration in the quality of the service (Bel and Fageda 2008).
Rationally, the decision of how much data to report in waste management contracts is
determined by a comparison of the benefits and costs of wastemanagement to the contract-
ing parties. Environmental stakeholders want to maximise benefits and waste management
providers want to minimise costs. In practice, the complex nature of the contingencies
involved and considerations of inter-generational equity produce the possibility of, at
best, a multi-equilibria solution to the problem. We seek to understand the existence of
the many different contracting outcomes with respect to the provision of waste data in
our case study through a transaction cost analysis using the theory of incomplete contracts.
The setting for this research is the Southern Waste Strategy Authority (SWSA), a duly
constituted LGA, including its 12 member councils and service providers, in Southern-
Tasmania, Australia. Waste management services are contracted in the SWSA jurisdiction
to a range of private, public and quasi-public service providers (Hyder Consulting 2011),
attempting to satisfy government policy directives for the establishment of multi-agency
arrangements and active partnerships. The question therefore arises: do the complex con-
tracts, arising from the myriad of relationships as suggested and directed by the implemen-
tation plan and the Tasmanian strategy, adequately specify the demand for waste data? If,
as prior research suggests, data to support the effective management of waste is deficient,
the question is: what are the underlying causes of the deficiency and how might they be
remedied? In the context of our case study, we answer this question by a textual analysis
of policy documents and interview transcripts.
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 5
185
190
195
200
205
210
215
220
225
Method
A narrative approach to textual analysis is adopted. This is used to place the themes that
content analysis identifies as being present in the texts in a dynamic setting, so that the
underlying causes of problems that evolve over time can be better understood (Weinberg
1994). Adding a narrative to a content analysis offers a way of testing a theory (McAdams
2012) as well as identifying emerging themes that may not be obvious from previous
research, thus allowing inductive development of new theories. The first stage of the
method used in this study, therefore, is a narrative analysis of the federal government’s
stated objectives over a period considered relevant to the issue being studied and the
record of attempts to implement it at the local level.
The second stage of the method is a content analysis of policy documents such as the
federal government’s implementation plan (EPHC 2010a). This was undertaken using
NVivo software to identify expected and unexpected themes in the source documents.
The text in 38 corporate plans and strategy statements of the LGAs in the SWSA jurisdic-
tion was also analysed for thematic references to waste service contracting. These docu-
ments covered periods varying from one to five years during the period 2008–2015.1
The third method component is a series of interviews with agents who are key players
in the southern Tasmanian waste industry. An interview protocol was constructed based
on the second stage document analysis. Twelve semi-structured, open-ended interviews
lasting between 40 and 60 minutes were conducted with senior and middle managers of
the Tasmanian state government, LGAs and their service providers and community repre-
sentatives. Descriptors (Table 1) are used sparingly to protect anonymity. The interviews
were transcribed and analysed with NVivo software. The interview protocol was approved
by the University of Tasmania ethics committee.
Findings
Contextual narrative
In 2011, Australia was the world’s seventh highest producer of waste per capita, disposing
of approximately 50 per cent in landfill as compared to 10 per cent in Western-European
countries (DEE 2014). In Tasmania, at least 70 per cent of waste is disposed in landfill,
with LGAs attending directly, or through complex contracting to the collection and
Table 1 . xxxQ3
¶
.
Interviewee Position in organisation Organisational type
1 General manager LGA A
2 Councillor LGA B
3 Community leader LGA G
4 Community leader LGA C
5 Senior manager LGA D
6 Senior manager Service provider A
7 General manager Service provider B
8 Senior manager Tasmanian Government
9 Senior manager LGA E
10 General manager Service provider C
11 Senior manager LGA E
12 Senior manager LGA F
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disposal of the great majority of municipal solid waste (Blue Environment 2014). The Aus-
tralian Federal Government’s obligations, resulting from internationally binding agree-
ments such as the Basel Convention, led to the Council of Australian Governments
(COAG) adopting the National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development in
1992 and a National Waste Policy and Implementation Plan in 2010 (EPHC 2010a).
COAG agreed that states would be responsible for the collection and reporting of regional
waste data to the federal government.
The implementation plan advocates improved waste management systems, including
data collection systems by suggesting the adoption of complex contracting of waste man-
agement services such as ‘multi-agency management arrangements’ and ‘active partner-
ships’ between governments and industry (EPHC 2010a). In response, the Tasmanian
government, through the Tasmanian Waste Strategy, assigned some of its responsibilities
to account for national waste data to LGAs and their service providers. The Tasmanian
strategy recommends that agencies support national data collection and reporting by
engaging in similar complex contracting initiatives such as ‘collaborative partnerships’
(EPA 2009). No reference to formal contracting principles is made by either the federal
or state governments.
Incomplete contracts
The corporate planning documents of LGAs show that contracts for waste management
services with external service providers are common. Five of the 12 councils in the
study included some aspect of contractual planning for waste management in their cor-
porate planning documents (Derwent Valley Council 2011, 12; Kingborough Council
2011, 9; Clarence City Council 2013, 72; Glamorgan Spring Bay Council 2013, 34, 53,
74; Tasman Council 2013, 35, 36). References made to waste contracts are mostly in
generic terms. For example, the Clarence City Council (2013) refers to the establishment
of new seven-year contracts for wheelie bin based collection of green waste, residual waste
and recyclables. No specific details of these contracts are provided (see also Derwent
Valley Council 2011, 12).
A consultant to the SWSA (Blue Environment 2011) reflected on the poor quality of
waste data by suggesting that contracts in the SWSA jurisdiction do not adequately
specify the demand for waste data:
There are gaps in recorded data in southern Tasmania, both on the amount and source of
generation of waste and on the amount and type of materials recovered. Council contracts
should address regular provision of this information by contractors. (89)
Most councils engage in resource-sharing and regional co-operation, which leads to col-
laborative contracts. For example, in the Derwent Valley Council long-term waste disposal
and waste transfer systems underlie the preferred mode of contracting for the municipality
in conjunction with other southern councils (Derwent Valley Council 2011, 8).
It is evident from text searches of relevant documents around the word ‘contract’, that
long-term contracts (e.g. 20-year waste disposal agreements) are common. For example,
the Copping regional authority, a landfill site which accommodates controlled wastes,
has longer-term contracts with their customers, which include several LGAs (Blue
Environment 2011, 18). Although formal contract management principles are observed
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 7
275
280
285
290
295
300
305
310
315
(Glamorgan Spring Bay Council 2013, 34, 38, 53), only limited opportunities to renegoti-
ate under-specification in long-term contracts are available. For instance, base rates in
some commercially attractive waste disposal contracts are only reviewed every 10 years
(Blue Environment 2011, 72).
As part of the interview process, participants were asked to consider how the demand
for waste data are constrained by contract specification. The LGA and waste service pro-
vider managers (Interviewee 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 11) agreed that a strong written contract,
with clear specifications regarding the demand for waste data, is essential for proper moni-
toring and management of those demands. For example;
So it is the duty of the local government when they give out contracts to make sure that they
got [sic] to report… You’ve got to give the monthly tonnage by the first ten days of the
month – very crystal clear… . (Interviewee 6)
And that’s where the councils have to be careful with the way they word their contracts, so
they’ve got to get the data and also potentially and preferably have the right to go and audit
the data so that they know that it’s correct.… You’ve got to be able to get the data and be
satisfied as to its quality. (Interviewee 7)
Managers observed that they are constrained to renegotiate increased specification by the
term of the contract. For example;
If I look at our waste contracts, –it’ll be another two or three years before the opportunity
exists to change that again… There’s no clause in there about waste data whatsoever.
There’s other stuff about the type of machinery and things like that but nothing about the
actual waste data. (Interviewee 12)
Quantification of waste streams requires specific measurement techniques such as weigh-
bridges and classification standards (Morrison and Munro 1999Q4
¶
). If a contract does not
allow for regular renegotiation, it is not possible for councils or regional bodies to
specify amendments to facilitate new and improved data collection techniques and stan-
dards, prescribed by higher levels of government (Ball, Broadbent, and Jarvis 2006; Net
Balance 2009; Curtis et al. 2014).
Agency issues
Strategic managerial issues relating to risk and monitoring contract specifications (Brown,
Potoski, and Van Slyke 2007) between LGAs and waste service providers are apparent in
corporate documents. For example, Kingborough Council ranks poor and inconsistent
management of contracts as a top strategic risk, whilst Glamorgan Spring Bay Council
promotes formal contract management policies as an appropriate risk response:
The top organisational or strategic risks are … failure of council to deliver expected infra-
structure and services through poor and inconsistent management of large contracts. (King-
borough Council 2011, 9)
Compile a contract register to ensure a more streamlined approach to contract management
across the organisation … Manage relevant leases and contracts. (Glamorgan Spring Bay
Council 2013, 34, 74)
Contract specification and trust in reputable suppliers (Brown, Potoski, and Van Slyke
2007) are important in determining the quality of waste data. Interviewee 5, a senior
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manager of a LGA, observed that quality waste data may be lacking even if the contract is
apparently otherwise adequately specified, since the choice of reputable waste service pro-
viders is also important:
… sometimes it’s hard, as [a] contract may be perfectly fine but you might end up with a
very bad contractor. But then you get a very good contractor who has all the good systems
… and they have their reputation, and so they have good systems … we never had any issues
getting data.
In contrasting the views of waste service providers with those of LGA managers, Intervie-
wee 10, the general manager of a national waste service provider, remarked that contract
specification is only part of the equation in providing quality waste data. Practicalities,
such as sorting waste into appropriate categories impacts on the quality of waste data:
It all depends on the ability of the transfer station to segregate waste. If the waste segregation
is done properly then our systems can pick it up okay … and [then] there’s probably no need
for a weighbridge per se there. But it all goes back to the written document as well.
Reid (2012) suggests that service-level agreements between different levels of government
improve communication and accountability. However, there was little evidence in the cor-
porate plans that such agreements are contemplated by LGAs to improve the flow of
environmental data. Only one reference to such an agreement was observed in the analysis
of the LGA corporate plans:
… commitment to the State Wide Partnership Agreement on Communication and Consul-
tation with the State Government (Kingborough Council 2013).
The Tasmanian state government suggests that the state-wide partnership agreement
assists in the consultation process with local government on relevant legislative proposals
and ensures that there is liaison on matters raised by the commonwealth government
(DPC 2016). As the implementation plan is a commonwealth matter, which requires con-
sultation between state and local governments, the expectation is that this agreement will
improve the collection of regional waste data. However, if categories of waste were not ade-
quately prescribed by higher levels of government, and thereafter in contract specification
between lower levels of government and waste service providers, information asymmetry
between multiple principles and agents would likely to continue.
Transaction costs
Several LGAmanagers (Interviewee’ 1, 5, 9 and 12) were concerned with contract manage-
ment and monitoring issues that impact indirectly on the demand for waste data. Strategic
managerial issues related to the increased cost of demanding and monitoring contract spe-
cifications were noted by these respondents.
Somemanagers of waste service providers (Interviewee 6, 7 and 10) noted that cost con-
siderations, when specifying the demand for waste data, play a key role for commercial
service providers. For instance:
We would’ve taken into account when we were tendering for that process – the requirements
of data collection. So there’s a cost, but we could adequately provide what they want … and
they probably need to be a little bit more specific in their contracts with what the requirement
is for data provision … . (Interviewee 10)
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As observed in a study on environmental accounting systems in Australian local govern-
ment (Qian, Burritt, and Monroe 2011), small and rural LGAs are constrained by a lack of
internal resources, with small contractors not always being able to supply adequate waste
data. The councillor of a small rural council confirmed the limited availability of recycling
contractors. Transaction costs constrain the council in demanding adequate waste data:
We are a small council. [Contractor name withheld] works two days a week … part of his
responsibility is to record that information … what it costs – Each year it’s just becoming
more and more expensive … we know exactly how much goes to landfill. As far as recycling,
we don’t know how much is recycled, because our contractor can’t even give away what he
gets out of the kerbside collection … And if we required that level of data collection from our
small country contractor - basically he couldn’t afford it. (Interviewee 2)
This is short of a hold-up or adverse selection problem but, in contrasting the service costs
of recycling and disposal of waste, the evidence is that increased transaction costs result in
the writing of under-specified contracts with respect to the demand for recycled waste
data. It also shows that additional transaction costs, in monitoring recycling services,
play a role in determining the quality of waste data. Even where the contract adequately
specifies the demand for waste data, service providers may not be willing to disclose data
due to unscrupulous practices (Brown, Potoski, and Van Slyke 2007). A general manager
of a waste service provider (Interviewee 7) explained that recyclables can easily be claimed
as being contaminated. This enables the recycler to dispose the so-claimed contaminated
waste stream, destined for resource recovery centres, in landfill (Loughlin and Barlaz
2006).
Social benefits and private costs
Public managers of LGAs are expected to improve the affordability of waste disposal ser-
vices to customers in the short term, but paradoxically, deliver strategic, long-term
responses to a broader range of stakeholders, to address the unabated increases in waste
disposal to landfill (Ball, Broadbent, and Moore 2002). Interviewee 11, the senior
manager of a LGA, considered that the oversight role councillors play in ensuring
clauses in the ‘social contract’ of government agencies with communities, could be
made implicit in commercial agreements with waste service providers:
… to me it is all in how you write your contracts, and how well your contracts are reviewed by
councillors, or if you’re using a consultant to write your contract, how good their knowledge
is and howmuch they know [what] your requirements are for reporting… in this type, in this
format… .
Depending on how councillors view their social obligations, affordable waste disposal ser-
vices may take preference over environmentally focussed initiatives aligned with the
national waste policy. Corporate planning documents refer to the importance of affordable
waste disposal as the cornerstone of regional waste policy. For example, Southern Waste
Solutions is a regional landfill facility and is managed collaboratively by four LGAs in the
SWSA jurisdiction. By entering into commercial-in-confidence, long-term contracts, and
committing themselves to disposal of waste to the landfill, economies of scale are likely to
result in lower waste disposal costs for the collaborating parties than would otherwise be
the case:
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The Owner Councils are to lease to the Authority the Land on the following terms… for an
initial term of fifty (50) years… . (SWS 2012a, 8, 29)
Negotiate commercially attractive long-term contracts to complement the life of the Copping
site, and seek the site operator’s support to share any emerging economies of scale. (SWS
2012b, 4)
The Copping site, as explained above, is a controversial issue in Southern Tasmania.
Environmentally conscious groups (Interviewee 3 and 4) argue its location, in a relatively
pristine environment near to the source of a river, which serves a range of amenities and
sensitive wildlife habitats, is a stark illustration of financial cost considerations out-ranking
environmental concerns (Hunt 2012). Local community leaders argue that the contracts
designed by government agencies with contractors do not meet the environmental expec-
tations of communities:
For council to ‘make money’ from the endpoint of waste disposal necessarily implies a landfill
outcome as it is the only endpoint outcome for waste that [so] they can afford the capital infra-
structure and potentiallymake amargin from [sic]… In effect they aremonopolising themarket
leading to the very poor overall outcomes for waste recovery in Tasmania. (Interviewee 3)
I can’t see anything really that if it impacts on community through local government that
shouldn’t be open… they shouldn’t have a profit motive, because I think then… you get
sort of shady business deals. (Interviewee 4)
Demand for transparent, quality environmental data to meet social expectations acknowl-
edges the existence of social transaction costs beyond financial outflows (Harriden and
Graymore 2013). Attempts to quantify the full cost of waste disposal to landfill through
levies, considering the social contract dimension of the process, are highly contested in
Tasmania (Hyder Consulting 2011; Bel, Fageda, and Warner 2014). In estimating the
benefits of collecting recyclables with low market value, estimates of collection rates
ignore the fact that considerable quantities of waste in Australia are being stockpiled
awaiting the identification of suitable markets, the existence of which now, or in the
future, is uncertain. Regulated information flows are therefore necessary to police the
illegal stockpiling of waste in Australia. This would address known corruption risks
linked to the illegal storage, dumping, transboundary shipment and trafficking of hazar-
dous waste (White and Heckenberg 2011).
Discussion
In this case study, the hierarchy of agents and institutions, from the federal government to
local contractors, involved in the processes of waste disposal, provides a complex environ-
ment within which to analyse issues relating to the provision of environmental waste man-
agement data via the theory of incomplete contracts (Hart and Moore 1999). At the top of
this hierarchy, federal legislation is affected by the wider social and environmental agenda
of international agencies (Burritt and Welch 1997). At lower levels, state and local govern-
ment interpret federal legislation in their regulations. When waste management processes
are mandated at community level new institutions such as the Southern Waste Strategy
Authority are created. Transaction cost economics play a key role in such collaborative
initiatives to satisfy implied social objectives, such as the safe and hygienic disposal of
waste and recycling (Curtis et al. 2014).
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Based on this case study evidence, LGA managers and their service providers consider
strong, written contracts at the local level to be essential for producing high-quality waste
management data necessary to support meeting environmental waste management goals
(Brown, Potoski, and Van Slyke 2006; 2010). Cost considerations in local service delivery
and agents’ behaviours with respect to these suggest that transaction cost principles play
an important role in explaining the extent of incomplete contracts at the operational level
(Williamson 1981). It is also evident that the demand for waste management data by
higher levels of government is constrained by the cost of renegotiating contract amend-
ments to facilitate new and improved data collection techniques. Consequently, in
addition to transaction cost and agency-type behaviours at the local operational level,
the public good aspects of waste management processes suggest viewing legislation and
regulations in this case as a form of an incomplete social contract that exists between
the different levels of government and their constituents
As the evidence in this, and other studies show, processes involving the treatment of
waste in modern economies that meet objectives involving the long-term protection of
the environment do not usually come into existence through the workings of the free
market or the conscientious application of ethical principles by individuals charged
with waste management at the local level (Bebbington and Gray 1993; Ball, Broadbent,
and Jarvis 2006).
In the context studied here, different agents and institutions at different levels in the
reporting hierarchy have different objectives and motives. Private waste disposal contrac-
tors seek profit whereas local authorities seek satisfactory outcomes at the lowest cost to
their ratepayers. Local governments represent a narrower constituency than the state gov-
ernment and the federal government is more focused on meeting its international obli-
gations than are the state governments, which have more domestic concerns. As the
reporting hierarchy for waste data is essentially top-down, the lack of precision in data
requirements and monitoring in federal legislation and regulations is reflected in contract-
ing at the local level. For example, in a recent national assessment of the net public econ-
omic, social and environmental benefits to be derived from diverting the disposal of
television and electrical equipment from landfill, senior public managers lamented the
lack of publicly available data to support their contingent valuation techniques (Blue
Environment 2014). Improved regulation of data flows would result in information
becoming available to estimate values associated with public tolerance of degraded
environmental conditions (Bennett et al. 2008).
Incompleteness in the social contract under this interpretation is a significant contri-
buting cause of incompleteness in contracts at the foot of the reporting hierarchy, at
the local level between LGAs and their outsourced agents. The assessment of net public
benefits from improved regulated, information flows at federal level extends to private
benefits for individuals at local level. Property owners are keenly interested in information
on the degree to which their assets are or will be devalued by increases in waste disposed to
landfill, or stockpiled, in nearby vicinities. In Pennsylvania, US, the state department of
environmental protection is required to consider information of disposal of types and
volumes of waste on property values when making landfill permitting decisions (Ready
2010). Improved information demanded by regulation result in improved compliance
and lower regulatory costs by avoiding communities becoming disenchanted and negating
the risk of costly combative legislative action.
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Conclusion
From the case study reported several major issues are identified.
First, there is clear evidence of incomplete commercial contracts at the grass-roots level.
Contracts between LGAs and service providers do not adequately specify waste data report-
ing obligations with a lack of opportunity for renegotiation. Second, the lack of data pro-
visions in incomplete contracts lead to a myriad of agency problems that extend
throughout waste management processes from the local to the national level. Service-level
agreements between the state and local government do not facilitate the collection and
reporting of waste data and the connection between federal and state policies is unclear.
Third, the additional transaction costs created by the introduction of processes mandated
by national waste management policies relative to their perceived benefit constrain the
data that are collected and reported at all levels of the waste management process. Fourth,
a lack of clarity in the statement and transmission of the objectives of the nationalwasteman-
agement policy and a lack of guidance as to how it should be implemented is an important
factor contributing to the problems associated with incomplete contracts in this instance.
Elements of incompleteness in the social contract implicit in federal government policy
documents relating to waste management data are reflected at local level in contracts
betweenLGAs and their service providers. The result is a lack of data formanagingwaste effec-
tively, acquitting accountability relationships from the local level upwards and of environ-
mental reporting at a national level being less accurate and informative than it could be.
Consequently, there is an argument supporting managerial style, quasi-contracts, poss-
ibly in the form of new regulations, which define obligations, rights and rewards, specifically
with respect to the provision of data, in the wastemanagement process.We find support for
this position inCurran andHollander’s (2002) empiricalfindings that ecological sustainable
development, regulatory review processes demand effective monitoring systems and infor-
mative reporting strategies. We concur with White and Heckenberg (2011) in calling for
effective regulation of waste information systems as part of the public manager’s toolkit
to combat corruption linked to illegal processing, shipment and disposal of especially hazar-
dous waste. In the light of the perceptions of the growing importance of environmental pro-
tection and sustainable economic processes, federal legislation should be designed to make
the clauses that deal with these matters in regulations and private contracts, at all levels of
the hierarchy described in this article, as ‘complete’ as possible.
Note
1. A textual analysis of individual waste disposal contracts was not possible due to these being
sensitive, commercial-in-confidence documents, not in the public domain (SWS 2012a).
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